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This brief case study aims to analyze the story of UniCredit during the economic downturn of 
the last decade, which had been the major difficulties and how the bank managed to overcome 
them.  The narration starts with the merger between the former Uni Credit and Capitalia in 
2007 and finishes at the beginning of 2018, when the bank seemed to have found its direction 
to exit the crisis. At the end of the case, a brief teaching note explores further some of the main 
topics that arose during the story telling.  
 















It was back on the 20th of May 2007 when a small Italian saver, Claudio Marchi, decided to 
invest part of his reserves in a newly created bank, becoming a minor shareholder, under the 
suggestion of his personal financial advisor. Actually, what triggered his decision was the 
ambitious merger plan between Capitalia and Uni Credit, whose aim was to create the first 
Italian bank and the fifth largest group in Europe1. The investment seemed promising both 
strategically and financially, and safe indeed; what he could not know at that time were the 
massive impact of the upcoming financial crisis and the subsequent implications for banks’ 
shareholders.  
1. The Profumo era (2007-2010) 
After the general meetings of the two banks, at the end of July 2007 the merger was approved 
and it would have been effective starting from the first day of October of the same year2. The 
operation was favorably supported by the stock market, even if the negative trend made the 
stock loose 14%, in line with other securities (Exhibit 1). In the new holding, a pivotal role 
would have been played by the three foundations that historically had constituted the core in 
the old Uni Credit ownership: CariVerona, Cassa di Risparmio di Torino (Crt) and Carimonte 
would have continued to own 12% of the new bank overall.  
Nonetheless, the event that gave birth to UniCredit Group almost coincided with the beginning 
of the worst economic downturn after the Great Depression, making the deal between the two 
banks impressively ill-timed.    
Despite its beginning, the impact of the financial crisis was not immediate in UniCredit’s 
performance: for the first semester, the Italian bank recorded a consolidated net income of 3.6 
billion, +16.6% compared to the previous year, and the exposure to US subprime loans was 
declared as marginal3. These positive figures persuaded Claudio think that the bank in which 
he had invested was in good conditions and probably its savings would have been preserved.  
Things started to slightly change in the beginning of November, when UniCredit shares closed 
at -4.68% (1st of November) and the crisis became a fully-fledged European matter. 
Furthermore, although low, UniCredit exposure to subprime loans was the highest among the 
Italian banks4.  
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In the middle of November, the results of the third trimester remained largely positive, with an 
increase in net income of 19% and a Roe of 17.5%5. However, since the beginning, one of the 
most critical aspect have been the massive amount of non-performing exposures originated in 
the domestic market: even if at that time the situation did not seem alarming, given an 
insolvency rate of 1% compared to a 20% in the US, UniCredit tried immediately to contain 
this issue. It offered a free renegotiation to its clients who were experiencing difficulties, caused 
by the higher interest rates in the market: thus, the maturity was extended and the mortgage 
payment was adapted to match the new unfavorable conditions (Bufacchi 2007).  
In the beginning of 2008 the financial crisis worsened and the Italian bank started to counteract. 
In February it reduced its exposure to US subprime loans, passing from 246 million to 164 
million at the end of 2007. This move was judged not sufficient by the rating agency Moody’s, 
which cut the ratings for UniCredit and revised its outlook. The main reasons lied in the scarce 
capital adequacy and reflected the fear that UniCredit would not be able to reinforce its capital 
structure6. In fact, Core Tier 1 in December 2007 was 5.83%, with an increase of 0.01% 
compared to the previous year, and the solvency ratio lowered of 0.39%, from 10.50% to 
10.11%. However, UniCredit kept reporting positive results, with a net income of almost 6 
billion, EPS of 0.54 and a dividend payment of 0.26 per share7.  
Following Moody’s verdict, in the beginning of October 2008 UniCredit declared that it would 
have transferred part of its real estate portfolio to a closed-end real estate fund. This operation 
was said to increase the Core Tier 1 ratio by 0.15%. Other transactions completed in September 
implied an improvement in the same ratio of 12 basis points. However, also Fitch unfavorably 
modified the ratings for both UniCredit Group and UniCredit on individual basis: this time, the 
negative outcome was reasoned by the lower commissions gained during the period and the 
general difficulties in the asset management sector8. 
Consequently, the 5th of October the Italian bank launched a 5-billion operation, in order to 
restore its ratios. The main aim was to take back the Core Tier 1 over 6%, having reached 5.5% 
in June. The plan was articulated in two moves: the first consisted in paying 2008 dividends 
through shares, thus avoiding a cash outflows of approximately 3-3.5 billion. The second phase 
consisted in the emission of a convertible and subordinated hybrid equity-linked (so called 
“cashes”) bond of 2 billion, that would be included in the calculus of Core Tier 1 ratio, thus 
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determining a strengthened capital. With the combined impact of the previously announced 
real estate dismissal, these operations would account for a total amount of 9 billion capital 
restructuring9. Especially the debt issue was favorably approved by the market: Profumo, 
UniCredit’s Ceo, declared that just three days after the pronouncement all the cashes bond were 
subscribed10. In addition, UniCredit’s exposure to Asset backed securities reduced of 5.3 billion 
compared to the previous year and the total risk weighted assets were expected to lower in 
2009, passing from 85 billion to 74 billion11. 
All these efforts were not enough anyway to reinvigorate the bank capitalization: a study 
conducted by R&S Mediobanca certified that UniCredit and Intesa, the two major Italian banks, 
had capital ratios below the European average. Specifically, for UniCredit the solvency 
coefficient was more than 2 points below (9.8% against 12%) and the Core Tier 1 was 5.6% 
against 6%12.  
Capital injections, both in the form of equity and debt, continued until the beginning of 2009. 
In November the bank issued 23-billion residential mortgage backed securities, with the 
declared objective of accumulating instruments that may be used as collaterals in refinancing 
operations with the European Central Bank, with a prudential scope13.  
In the end of December 2008 a capital increase of 3 billion was announced and soon approved 
by Consob14.  
Later on, Profit Participation Rights (PPR) for 1.1 billion were transferred from Bank Austria 
to B&C Privatsiftung, implying the Core Tier 1 to increase and reach 6.7%15. 
The beginning of 2009 was mainly dedicated to the realization of the capital increase. Some 
frictions arose when CariVerona Foundation, the first shareholder in UniCredit, refused to 
participate and to subscribe 500 millions of convertible bonds. However, through the purchase 
of shares on the secondary market, the foundation remained the major shareholder. Some days 
later, on the 8th of February, the remaining part of convertible bonds was subscribed by the 
second and the third shareholders of the bank, Central Bank of Libya and Munich Re 
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respectively16. At the end of February, all the cashes resulted underwritten and the capital 
increase was completed, for an overall amount of 2.99 billion17.  
As previously announced, UniCredit did not distribute any dividend in form of cash for the 
year 2008. Instead, the bank distributed new shares to existing shareholders, thus determining 
a script dividend18. Claudio, who sustained the capital increase without diluting his share, 
continued to believe that UniCredit would grow again.   
But once again, the fresh infused capital was not adequate and a second issuance of a 3-year 
maturity bond of 1.5 billion soon followed19. Additionally, in June the Italian bank prepared an 
emission of covered bonds, with the aim of gathering at least one more billion20.  
At the end of June UniCredit completed the issuance, in which 4 billions were collected through 
preferred bonds with a 7-year maturity.  
The capital gathering had a significant impact on the bank’s Core Tier 1: in June it increased 
of 31 basis points compared to the end of March, reaching 6.69%21.  
While UniCredit was completing its capital booster, Italian banking sector was in serious 
difficulties, so the government offered its help through the so-called “Tremonti bonds”, that is 
debt instruments that the public sector would have subscribed to reinforce banks’ capital and 
to support Italian SMEs. However, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo declined the offer, declaring 
that they would rely on their own private sources in order to restore their capital structure. In 
particular, the former announced a new rights issue of 4 billion to meet its capital 
requirements22.  
Meanwhile, in the beginning of November, a structural change in the Italian bank was about to 
be launched: following the examples of Bnp Paribas and Santander, all the corporate divisions 
(UniCredit Banca di Roma, UniCredit Banca, UniCredit Private Banking, UniCredit Corporate 
Banking and Banco di Sicilia) were going to be merged, mainly to achieve cost savings that 
would have benefited the financial situation. The unified structure was supposed to be effective 
by the 1st of November 201023.  
In the end of the year, the road toward financial strength was still long and another effort was 
requested to UniCredit’s shareholders: that was the previously proclaimed capital increase of 
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4 billion, to be completed between January and February24. In addition, at the end of November, 
a new emission of 1.5 billion bond aimed for the reinforcement of Tier 1 ratio. 
In the beginning of February 2010, the former operation had been completed and later the 
yearly results were published: a significant decrease in net income compared to the previous 
year but a dividend distribution equal to 0.03 euro per ordinary share and 0.045 euro per 
preferred share25. 
The capital storage did not conclude and on the 14th of July UniCredit launched a new issuance 
of hybrid bonds, that presented both debt and equity characteristics, for an overall amount of 
500 million26.  
2. The first change in leadership and Ghizzoni management (2010-2016) 
Although recognized as an excellent leader, especially during the last years of financial crisis, 
on the 22nd of September Mr. Profumo offered his resignation as Ceo of UniCredit. The main 
cause was the so-called Libyan issue, in which Tripoli property (composed by Central Bank of 
Libya and Libyan Investment Authority) reached 7.6% through a rapid escalation. During this 
phase, Profumo was judged too autonomous and independent from the Board and shareholders, 
which strongly claimed for his leaving, especially the three foundations27.  
The change in governance was fast and eight days later the new Ceo was appointed, Mr. 
Federico Ghizzoni. Soon after, Q3 results were published and with a Core Tier 1 of 8.61% 
UniCredit seemed ready for Basel III regulation28. 
2011 might be considered as the year of contradictions: while in the beginning UniCredit 
management, included the Ceo, continuously declared that no other capital increase would have 
been necessary, in the 15th of October a new operation was launched for an amount of 7.5 
billion, partly compromising Ghizzoni’s reputation and accountability.  
The year began with a cleaning in the bank’s financial statement, impairing losses for 359 
million originated in one of UniCredit’s subsidiaries, Atf Bank from Kazakistan29.  
It is in the middle of April that Ghizzoni started to affirm that UniCredit would have not 
incurred in other rights issues, at least in the short run, given its solid capital structure. 
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Furthermore, in 2013 the bank should have been able to reach a common equity ratio equal to 
8.4%, above the amount required by Basel III regulation30.  
At the end of the same month, results of the previous year were published, with a positive net 
income and a dividend yield of 1.7%, with 0.03 euro per share distributed to shareholders31. 
On the 28th of May UniCredit prepared the restructuring of 3 billion of “cashes bond” used 
during the capital increase that had occurred between 2008 and 2009. In fact, according to the 
new rules of Basel III, those instruments would not have been included in the computation of 
Core Tier 1 ratio. The restructuring would imply the bonds’ yield to be connected to the 
dividend, in order to align them with the equity capital32. 
In the meanwhile, the Board of Directors approved an eventual operation for the securitization 
of up to 14 billion of retail loans, guaranteeing new liquidity. The results of the first half of the 
year were encouraging: net income registered a +97.5%, Core Tier 1 reached 9.12% and also 
the intermediation margin recorded an improvement compared to previous period (+1.6%).  
Despite what had been previously stated and the good outcome achieved, UniCredit’s Ceo 
Ghizzoni, during an interview with Financial Times, revealed that both the market and that 
bank’s investors were ready to sustain a new capital increase, in order to lead the Core Tier 1 
capital ratio above 10% 33 . Soon after, UniCredit launched a capital rise of 7.5 billion, 
accompanied by a strategic plan aimed for a significant cost reduction within the bank structure. 
In addition, the European Banking Authority required UniCredit to cover a supplementary 
buffer of approximately 7.4 billion, that would reduce to 4.4 billion, considering the operation 
of bond restructuring previously explained34.  
After the transaction had been approved by both shareholders’ meeting and Consob, on the 5th 
of January 2012 the details of the operation were delineated. The discount was 43% compared 
to Theoretical ex-rights price (TERP)35 and each shareholder received the right to purchase a 
new share every two ordinary shares formerly owned36. On one hand, the so-called issue-price 
irrelevance hypothesis states that the sole reason of discounts is to ensure that the offer price 
remains lower than the market price until the offer closes; thus, deep discounts are irrelevant 
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for the wealth of subscribing or non-subscribing shareholders and they do not represent a cost 
for the company (Armitage 2000; Tsangarakis 1996). Other studies sustain the signaling 
hypothesis (Heinkel and Schwartz 1986), according to which subscription discounts conveys a 
signal about the firm quality. In fact, in UniCredit’s case, the excessive discount became a 
matter of alarm both for stock market and analysts, interpreted as an indication of the deep and 
ongoing crisis that was hitting the European banking sector and the difficulties faced to raise 
fresh capital37. On the 28th of January the capital increase was officially concluded, with the 
99.8% of shares subscribed38.  
The outcome of the capital rise was shortly exhibited: the main aim of extending Core Tier 1 
up to 10% was achieved, with the latest value of 10.35%.  
Thereafter, the results for the previous financial year were disclosed: in 2011 the Italian bank 
recorded a loss of 6.35 billion. Despite the huge and increased amount of provisions for bad 
loans (Exhibit 2), the net operating result remained positive, although decreasing of 70.5% 
compared to the previous year. The most negatively affecting voice was “goodwill 
adjustments”, whose amount was caused by intensified regulation and worsening of 
macroeconomic scenario. Given the harmful results, the meeting agreed to not distribute any 
dividend to shareholders39. 
On the 4th of September, a new issuance of 1 billion covered bond was completed, trying to 
gather new funds40. 
The 2013 showed first signals of recovery. At the beginning of the year, in January, the Italian 
bank sold 9.1% of Pekao, one of its Polish subsidiaries, although remaining its major 
shareholder, with a share of 50.1%41. Later on, the results of the previous year were announced, 
with a positive net income of 865 billion and a dividend per share of 0.09 euro. Funds for 
deteriorated debt amounted to 9.6 billion, but Core Tier 1 registered a growth of 2.4%, passing 
from 8.40% in December 2011 to 10.84% in the same month in 201242.  
During the year, Core Tier 1 kept growing, reaching 11.03% in May. Moreover, a significant 
drop in provisions for bad loans (1.2 billion against 4.6 billion in 2012) gave the hope of a 
rapid improvement.  
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The results of the first semester confirmed the positive performance, with a net income higher 
than expected (449 million against the 349 predicted), a growth rate of 31% and a slowdown 
of the impact of deteriorated loans4344.  
Supported by the favorable trend, UniCredit decided to invest again in the Eastern Europe 
market, expanding its presence in Poland. It did a preliminary offer to the bank Bgz, controlled 
by the Dutch bank Rabobank. Meanwhile, it dismissed its participation in FondiariaSai, for a 
share of 6.7%45. 
In the first half of November, Q3 results were published. UniCredit recorded a positive 
performance, despite the difficult macroeconomic situation in Italy and the burden of its bad 
loans. In terms of capital strength, the bank was already meeting the requirements that would 
have been imposed by Basel III: Core Tier 1 reached 11.71% and Common Equity Tier 1 was 
equal to 9.83%46. 
2014 began with the securitization of a portfolio of 910 million loans, mainly Italian credits 
derived by project finance investments. Almost half of the securitization was underwritten by 
an American investment group, confirming the foreign interest for the European and Italian 
market. 47 
In March, the financial statement of the previous year showed a loss of 11 billion. The main 
components responsible for the loss were impairment of goodwill for 9.3 billion and 
deteriorated loan provisions for 13.7 billion. However, the capital composition of the bank 
reinforced, with a Cet1 equal to 10.4% and a Cash covered ratio of 52%. In addition, a script 
dividend for the amount of 0.10 euro per share was distributed to shareholders, despite the 
negative net income48.  
With the results of 2013, a new strategic plan for the period 2013-2018 was presented. The 
plan was based on cost cutting and optimization of the operations, including the layoff of 8,500 
employees, of whom 5,500 are Italians49. Moreover, the Ceo announced the future Ipo of 
Fineco Bank, that would occur during 201450.  
The efforts for “cleaning” financial statements made by Italian banks, UniCredit in particular, 
were explicitly appreciated by rating agencies: Italian banking sector as a whole increased its 
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provisions for bad debt, with UniCredit accounting for 70% of the impairment losses 
announced51. 
Additionally, at the end of March the bank prepared the issuance of a perpetual bond with a 
call option to be exercised after 10 years; the operation was done in collaboration with a pool 
of joint book runners. The bond, with a coupon rate that exceeded 5.125%, would be included 
in the computation of Common equity tier 152.  
The second part of 2014 was characterized by some initial and timid operations to restructure 
the bank portfolio, especially on the asset side, by transferring part of its non-performing 
exposures and by selling non-core business (Exhibit 5).  
In April, the bank presented a formal prospectus to Consob, for Fineco listing in Milan stock 
exchange. According to the strategic decision, after the IPO UniCredit would have maintained 
control, remaining the major shareholder53.  
Few days later, UniCredit together with Intesa Sanpaolo started working to restructure their 
loan portfolios. The two banks agreed to transfer their Non-performing loans (NPLs) to an ad-
hoc vehicle in order to optimize their asset performance. At that time, it seemed that the whole 
amount subjected to transfer was approximately 2 billion euros, originated from 10-15 
companies of medium dimensions. In the meanwhile, bad loans kept decreasing, registering a 
-1.3% in May compared to the previous trimester54. 
In August, UniCredit proceeded to sell its share of DAB online bank to Bnp Paribas and the 
results of the first semester seemed promising: net income was equal to 11.4 billion and the 
fully-loaded pro-forma CET1, considering the IPO of Fineco and the selling of DAB, amounted 
to 10.4%55. 
Continuing the restructuring process of its assets, at the end of the summer new rumors about 
the selling of Pioneer, UniCredit’s Asset management subsidiary, started to circulate.  
Meanwhile, in September UniCredit prepared the issuance of 1.3 billion of Asset backed 
securities in Dublin Stock Exchange56. In October 2014, the outcome of stress tests performed 
by EBA was published, with the Italian bank recording good results: its surplus of capital 
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amounted to 8.747 billion57. Given those achievements, UniCredit Ceo confirmed the target of 
2 billion for the net income of 201458.  
This target was confirmed to be reached, at the beginning of 2015. For the financial year ended 
in 2014, the bank distributed a script dividend of 0.12 euro per share59. 
In 2015, the efforts to reduce the amount of NPLs continued, in a more vigorous manner. 
First, UniCredit proceeded to the disposal of UniCredit Credit Management Bank S.p.A. 
(UCCMB) to the consortium formed by Fortress and Prelium, including a portfolio of 2.4 
billion of bad loans60 . In July, another operation involving non-performing exposures led 
UniCredit to the selling of 625 millions of NPLs to Pra Group Europe61. After two years of 
proceedings, the Italian bank completed the disposal of a total amount of 1.9 billions of non-
performing loans. 
The achievements of the first semester were published at the beginning of August. UniCredit 
reached a Common equity tier 1 of 10.38%; its net income amounted to 1.03 billion for whole 
period of 6 months and 552 million for Q2. Bad loans experienced a further decrease of 4.3%, 
especially thanks to the latest disposals coming from the non-core bank, whose assets had 
lowered of 2.2 billion62. 
In November 2015, two major events impacted on bank’s performance. First, the negative and 
persistent macroeconomic conditions forced UniCredit’s management to revise the strategic 
plan, that was supposed to guide the years from 2014 and 2018: negative interest rates, difficult 
growth of the banking industry and flat inflation led to a negative correction of the previously 
established targets.  
Secondly, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued an international standard for global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) on loss-absorbing and recapitalization capacity in case 
of resolution. The main innovation was the introduction of the so called “minimum Total loss-
absorbing capacity” (Tlac). Tlac comprises both capital instruments (CET1, Additional T1 and 
T2) and long-term unsecured debt (subordinated and senior debt), that can be written down or 
converted into equity in case of resolution. FSB determined that the minimum Tlac G-SIBs 
needed to reach was 16% of risk-weighted assets by January 2019, rising to 18% by the 
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beginning of 2022. In addition, Tlac had to account for 6% and 6.75% of the Leverage ratio 
exposure by 2019 and by 2022 respectively63.  
These two episodes deeply influenced the strategy UniCredit followed onward. The bank 
concentrated only on core activities, continuing the disposals of non-essential assets and cost 
cutting. 
On the 12th of November, the new strategic plan was published, in which two of the main pillars 
were a consistent reduction of operative costs and the disposal or the restructuring of non-
performing assets. Moreover, capital objectives were set, to be reached by 2018: Cet1 should 
amount to 12.6%, net income to 5.3 billion, Roe at 11% and in the following three years the 
dividend distribution would account for 40% of net income64. 
3. The French way: Jean Pierre Mustier (2016-now) 
The first part of 2016 was marked by the second main change in leadership: at the end of May 
the previous Ceo Federico Ghizzoni resigned and on the 11th of July Jean Pierre Mustier, 
formerly head of the Corporate and Investment banking division, was elected as his successor 
in UniCredit guidance65. In 2016 the overall Italian banking sector was in a serious and difficult 
moment: despite the efforts made, the burden of Non-performing loans has remained elevated. 
In addition, the market seemed to hope for a new capital increase to reinforce capital stability 
of the bank. Just after his election, Mustier stated that the bank would adopt a diversified 
approach for its assets, with the main aim of creating value for its stakeholders. 
The new Ceo immediately showed his resolution and determination, through two powerful 
operations that delivered a clear message to the market66. 
First, an accelerated book building was announced, consisting of the launch of 10% of Fineco’s 
shares. The process was concluded just one day after, on the 12th of June, for a total price of 
328 million and an increase of Cet1 of 8 basis point67. 
Secondly, the disposal of 10% of Pekao was prepared, for an estimated price of 750 million. 
UniCredit would have remained the major shareholder at the end of the process, retaining 40.1% 
of shares68.  
																																																						
63 Davi 2015 
64 Ferrando 2015 
65 Ferrando 2016 
66 Graziani 2016 
67 D’Ascenzo 2016 
68 Il Sole 24 ORE 2016 
	
14 
In just 5 days, UniCredit’s capital requirements registered an increase in Cet1 of 20 basis points 
and its share price rose of about 17.7%, thus confirming the satisfaction of investors regarding 
the previous two moves. However, despite the improvements accomplished, the President 
Giuseppe Vita admitted that a new capital increase would be necessary, because European 
Central Bank would not probably consider enough the already made efforts69. 
In August, UniCredit pushed further on the valuation of strategic disposal of assets. Two of the 
major candidates, according to the rumors, were the remaining share of the Polish bank Pekao 
and the asset management company Pioneer, after that the deal with Santander was off.  
In October, a new accelerated book building was launched for a further 20% of Fineco. After 
the operation, UniCredit retained 35% of the shares, collecting 550 million and increasing the 
Cet1 of 12 basis points70.  
Few days later, Pekao’s disposal was confirmed, positively welcomed by stock market71 . 
Meanwhile, another Polish company, Kruk Group, agreed to purchase 940 million euros of bad 
loans from UniCredit72. 
Finally, between the end of November and the first half of December, final arrangements were 
reached both for Pekao and Pioneer. The deal for the former imposed the transfer of 32.8% of 
the Polish bank to Pzu-Pfr (a listed insurer and a state-owned development fund respectively) 
for 2.4 billion, to be concluded in the first half of 2017 and impacting on Cet1 by 55 basis 
points. On the 12th of December, a binding accord between UniCredit and Amundi73 established 
the selling of Pioneer for 3.545 billion plus a special dividend of 315 million. The successful 
operation provided to UniCredit a capital gain of 2.2 billion and a positive impact on Cet1 of 
78 basis points74.  
In the meantime, the Italian bank continued with its liability restructuring, selling a 1.4 billion 
portfolio of bad loans to Pimco, an American investment management firm. The relationship 
between UniCredit and Pimco led to another impressive divestiture of 17.7 billion euros of bad 
loans in favor of the American company and of Fortress Investment group, signing the so-
called Fino project (Failure Is Not an Option)75.  
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On 13th of December, what investors had already forecasted was finally revealed and detailed 
by UniCredit’s management, through the publishing of the so-called Transform 2019, the 
bank’s new strategic plan76. First, it was announced another capital increase, the largest that 
the bank has faced so far: 13 billion euros of new issued shares would have been necessary to 
cover the capital demand. With this new operation, UniCredit would have almost doubled its 
market capitalization. However, the feedback was encouraging, with a share price rise of 44% 
in 30 days from the end of November until the 22nd of December, determining a clear and 
explicit approval on UniCredit’s conduct77.  
The other major points that Transform 2019 took into account were the reduction human 
resources, for approximately 14 thousand estimated redundancies. Additionally, maxi-
provisions for Non-performing loans of 8 billion would contribute to definitely clean the 
balance sheet of the Italian bank from non-performing exposures. The declared aim of this set 
of operations was to reach a Rote of 9% and a Cet1 of 12.5% by 2019. 
The burden of this cleaning process remarkably encumbered financial results of 2016: an 
additional impairment of “Fondo Atlante78” for 1 billion brought the overall loss to 11.8 billion, 
diminishing Cet1 to 8%. According to the general meeting, dividends would not be distributed79.  
The agenda for the capital increase started on the 5th of February 201780 and the whole process 
was finished at the end of the same month. The discount offered on the theoretical ex-rights 
price was 38%, implying that each share could be bought for 8.08 euros. The operation was a 
success, accompanied by the deep reorganization in UniCredit’s asset side: on the 3rd March, 
the stock price registered an increase of 15% during the previous traded week and a +3.7% 
compared to the previous day81.  
Few months later, by the beginning of July, the disposals of both Pekao Bank and Pioneer 
Investments were finally concluded. The former was sold for a price of 2.5 billion and impacted 
on Cet1 for +70 basis points, while the latter implied a capital gain of more than 2 billion (as 
already negotiated) and an increase in Cet1 of 84 basis points82. 
																																																						
76 Ferrando 2016 
77 Il Sole 24 ORE 2016 
78 Fondo Atlante is a private investment fund established in April 2016 with the participation of both private and 
public banking institutions (banks, banking foundations, the Italian Treasury and Cassa Depositi e Prestiti). The 
aim was funding banks that were experiencing liquidity shortage. 
79 UniCredit Group 2016 
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In addition, UniCredit acted on the liability side of its balance sheet, issuing new instruments 
that have reinforced its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital levels. By the first half of June, the Italian 
bank had completed four different issuances, for a total of approximately 4.2 billion euros 
gathered83. Thanks to this operation, the bank succeeded in lengthening the duration of its 
subordinated notes and it strengthened its Tier 2 ratio, that was already above the regulatory 
requirements.   
Meanwhile, the first part of Fino Project was concluded, with the successful disposal of the 
first half (50.1%) of its portfolio composed by 17.7 billions of bad loans; the remaining 49.9% 
was to be reduced to 20% in the second phase of the operation84.  
Results of the first semester were a breath of fresh air compared to the difficult time UniCredit 
had passed: net income increased of 40.6% compared to the same period in 2016, with a slight 
reduction in the interest margin (-0.7%) but an improved performance in net commissions 
(+7.7%). Capital ratios were showing signs of recovery, after the capital increase and the clean-
up of 2016 financial statement: Cet1 fully loaded amounted to 12.8% (against 10.33% of the 
previous year). Bad loans kept decreasing and cost cutting, implying a reduction of branches 
and employees, continued according to Transform 201985. 
 
Despite the discouraging moments that he has passed during the crisis, Claudio Marchi kept 
his participation in UniCredit capital, believing that the bank’s performance would have 
improved. His efforts have been rewarded only after Mustier’s nomination as Ceo in 2016, 
when the condition of the major Italian bank started to recover again and its share price slightly 
increased.  
However, he felt that something went wrong during the crisis and that something better could 
have been done at management level in order to overcome all the issues that the bank faced. In 
the initial part, large capital injections were required, both on the equity and debt side. 
Afterwards, with Ghizzoni’s guidance, Claudio had the sensation that the bank kept pretending 
it was in good shape. Finally, Mustier in 2016 opened the giant Pandora’s box, which revealed 
a bank oppressed by the amount of NPLs and undercapitalized. 
																																																						
83 Monti 2017 
84 Paronetto 2017 




I. Why UniCredit decided to raise its capital for four times during financial crisis, instead 
of asking the whole amount at once to its shareholders? 
All in all, UniCredit raised 27.5bn from 2008 to 2017 through issuance of new shares, sustained 
by shareholders. It is a massive amount, especially regarding the last equity injection of 13bn, 
that has almost doubled UniCredit capitalization.  
At least three different hypotheses may be formulated in order to explain why the bank 
preferred to repetitively ask for fresh capital instead of requiring funds all at once: 
1. Evolution of capital requirements throughout the years of financial crisis  
According to this hypothesis, it is fair to assume that the bank did not actually have a capital 
shortfall of more than 25 billions at the beginning of 2008, but it rather had to deal with it for 
all the duration of the economic downturn due to the increase in capital requirements imposed 
by European regulation and supervisory authorities. 
In fact, at the very beginning of the crisis, the sole capital boundary was the one enforced by 
Basel II Accord, in which the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital had to equal at least 8% of risk-
weighted assets.  
Since the earliest phases of the crisis, the accord showed its flaws and the need for a more 
prudential set of rules arose, aiming to prevent future systemic crisis and to create a more 
resilient banking sector. Consequently, works for the so-called Basel III started right after and 
in 2013 two legislative acts (Capital Requirements Directive and Capital Requirements 
Regulation – CRD IV/CRR) implemented new and more binding standards for European banks. 
Common Equity Tier 1 was set to a minimum of 4.5% of RWA, new liquidity requirements 
increased the level of liquid assets a bank needed to keep and three additional buffers of CET1 
capital were established to ensure capital conservation, contrast countercyclical effect and 
avoid systemic risk. Additionally, another buffer was provided for globally systemically 
institutions.  
Moreover, stress tests carried out by EBA highlighted the relatively weak position of the 
UniCredit compared to its European peers in terms of capital position. This has pushed the 
bank to strengthen its capital structure through the emission of new shares to be directly 
computed within Core Tier 1 capital. 
These two elements, the new regulation and authority-performed stress tests, and thus the 
increasing need for capital, may be the reason that led UniCredit to opt for repeatedly fund 
gathering procedures instead of one operation at once.  
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2. Risks associated with high capital increases 
Another possible explanation may rely on the risks that UniCredit would have incurred if it 
had chosen to request larger amounts but with fewer procedures. 
In literature, it is well documented the stock underperformance of firms that conduct seasoned 
equity offerings compared to ones that do not issue new equity (Loughran and Ritter 1997; 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves 1995). The explanation is connected with the theory exposed by 
Myers and Majluf (1984), according to which there is an intrinsic adverse selection problem 
associated with SEOs. SEOs may occur as result of a management internal decision or because 
bank regulators force the institution to raise new capital. In both cases, the issuance of new 
shares will send a negative signal to the market: in the first circumstance, because investors 
will think that management has negative information and the firm is overvalued, therefore they 
have recourse to equity. In the second situation, the bank will be regarded as in distress situation, 
although the effect may be much smaller, given the fact that all the financial institutions would 
be required to boost their capital ratios. 
Another risk that may be associated with large calls for equity is the fear that majority 
shareholders do not sustain, fully or partially, the rights issue. Since the approval of the 
operation is subject to the consent of existing shareholders, they may be reluctant to accept 
mainly because this would mean investing more in order to maintain the same voting power or 
diluting their share, by selling the rights. Thus, it becomes problematic to realize rights issue if 
shareholders do not agree.   
Additionally, a recent empirical study by Elyasiani, Mester and Pagano (2010) evidenced how 
larger capital infusions impact on return and risk performance of financial institutions over the 
business cycle. Results show that investors reacted negatively to the news of larger SEO 
announcements in the short-term and larger issuers faced higher post-announcement systematic 
risk.  
The theoretical foundation and the empirical evidence confirmation may suggest a good 
explanation to (at least partially) justify the strategy followed by UniCredit: they tried to limit 
the amount asked and probably hoped to not ask further funds each time they recurred to a 
SEO, in order to minimize negative effect related to this operation. 
3. Extend-and-pretend strategy/wait-and-see approach 
Lastly, the concluding hypothesis is that the bank, although recognizing its capital shortfall 
since the beginning of the crisis, did not voluntarily show to the market its vulnerable position, 
expecting better conditions in future periods and temporarily hiding its capital inadequacy. In 
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this way, the bank avoids to report the full amount of its losses, postponing restructuring or 
deleveraging, until a certain threshold is met, thus requiring a capital injection.   
This approach, often referred to as extend-and-pretend or wait-and-see strategy, was indeed 
quite frequent for European banks, that delayed in recognizing losses; this, in turn, led to 
reduced lending, as delays force banks to increase provisions during stress times, namely when 
losses materialize and regulatory capital requirements become most binding (European 
Commission 2018).  
II. Considering needs for additional capital that the bank experienced for all the crisis years, 
why UniCredit kept paying dividends to its shareholders, except in 2016? 
Two main reasons may be identified in order to answer the question: 
1. The first and simplistic view, that may explain the 2007-2008 dividend policy, relies on a 
declaration of Profumo himself in 2008: the bank had underestimated the effects and impact of 
financial crisis and there had been “some errors of judgement” internally (The New York Times 
2008). This may justify why the bank, that did not expect a so-severe distress, initially 
maintained a positive payout to its shareholders instead of conserving its net income in the 
form of retained earnings, as potential buffer for subsequent losses or capital requirements. 
If this might be a possible clarification for the initial period of the crisis, the subsequent 
continuation of a positive dividend distribution falls into contradiction: it is clear that, once the 
bank had realized the real repercussions of the economic downturn, it should have corrected 
its strategy by cutting payout. Instead, UniCredit kept remunerating its shareholders even when 
the share price was shrinking and several capital injections were needed to restore a sufficient 
level of capital strength.  
2. Therefore, a second hypothesis should be searched among the theories that explain why 
companies pay dividend in place for retaining the earnings and subsequently investing them, 
rewarding their shareholders through capital gains and avoiding the double taxation.  
Several academic authors have proposed different approaches to study this phenomenon: 
Miller and Scholes (1978) based their intuition on limit on interest deduction; Auerbach (1979), 
Bradford (1979) and King (1977) developed a model that compared market value of retained 
earnings and net value of dividend; Feldstein (1979) built his explanation on shareholder’s risk 
aversion and existence of shareholders in different tax situation. However, the theory that 
seems more consistent with UniCredit’s behavior is the dividend signaling. According to this 
(Bhattacharya 1979), dividends are required because of the separation of ownership and 
management and information asymmetry related problems: they become a signal of the 
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sustainable income of the firm and its growth opportunity. Through dividend distribution, 
management testimonies that the firm is in good shape and able to generate a return for its 
investors (Miller and Rock 1985). This is needed because it is clearly difficult for external 
agents to assess the bank assets’ quality: through dividends, shareholders, creditors and 
depositors receive an implicit signal about the bank solvency (Floyd, Li, and Skinner 2015), 
avoiding runs and other costs of distress.  
Strictly linked to dividend signaling, dividend smoothing hypothesis affirms that dividends are 
infrequently decreased but also not increased to an unmaintainable level, to avoid cutting and 
send a negative message to the market.  
In fact, UniCredit continued to declare its financial health and the meeting of its targets 
throughout the years, even when incurring in serious troubles. Only with Mustier management 
and the deep cleaning of its balance sheet, UniCredit could not avoid to show its real nature: 
an undercapitalized bank that needed the fourth capital issue and with a massive amount of 
non-performing exposures.    
The dividend signaling hypothesis is corroborated if we observe the other European banks’ 
behavior during 2008-2013: despite their worsening financial situation (in some cases even 
when receiving bailout money), many banks were reluctant to cut dividends or did so relatively 
slowly (Acharya et al. 2011; Basse et al. 2014).  
Having said this, two main criticisms arise: 
• First, an empirical study of Basse T. et al. (2014) observed the correlation between 
dividends and earnings among European banks during crisis. According to their model, 
if finding indicated that dividends explain corporate earnings, this would be supportive 
for the dividend signaling hypothesis; while the opposite relation would be supportive 
for the dividend smoothing. The results showed that “quite clearly (…) there is no 
empirical evidence for dividend signaling or dividend smoothing because neither the 
response of dividends to a shock to corporate earnings nor the reaction of earnings to a 
shock to dividends is statistically significant”.  
• Second, even if a sort of correlation between earnings and dividends held, the market 
would not interpret as a negative signal a dividend cutting made by all the banks 
simultaneously, given their needs for capital. The collective behavior might 
compensate for the adverse effect generated by single bank decisions. However, the 
issue seems to assume the connotations of a prisoner dilemma: all the banks would be 
better off by cutting dividends, but deviations may lead to contrasting signaling. Thus, 
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in the end, all the banks chose to keep paying dividends.   
These two main points suggest that a dividend cutting or dividend omitting strategy should 
have been pursued, not only by UniCredit but also by the other European banks, to improve 
their financial strength.  
III. What are the main risks associated with having foundations among the bank ownership? 
Did the bank take corrective measures throughout the years and, if so, why? 
Italian banking foundations are a peculiar phenomenon that originated in 1990s after the 
privatization of the banking system. Before the so-called Amato Laws, the Italian credit system 
was composed by public savings banks, involved in both lending activities and philanthropic 
actions whose beneficiaries were local territories. Soon after, the two elements were separated, 
by the creation on one hand of privately owned banks, appointed for the credit activity, and on 
the other hand of charitable foundations, which have kept the humanitarian pursuit. However, 
a participation relationship continued to bound the two entities. 
In UniCredit, the three foundations (CariVerona, Crt and Carimonte) had maintained a relevant 
stake for all the years of the crisis, significantly reduced only after the last and major injection 
of capital in 2017. Their power was also reinforced by the combination of a particular 
mechanism of election for the Board of Directors (voto di lista) and a specific shareholder 
agreement, in which they commit to vote for a common list of Board members (Exhibit 6): 
thus, even with a share of less than 10%, they were able to nominate more than 80% of the 
Board (Jassaud 2014). 
Bearing this in mind, at least four risks are identifiable in having banking foundations among 
the ownership of a bank (Jassaud 2014): 
1. The financial position of foundations has deteriorated, arising concerns about their ability to 
provide further support, if needed. In fact, their participation in UniCredit has continued to 
decrease over time, not keeping up with the capital needs of the bank. However, this did not 
prevent UniCredit to raise the capital it needed through the entry of new shareholders. In other 
cases, foundations may exclude the access of new investors, causing a major impact on 
financial strength of the bank. 
2. Foundations bear high concentration of risks. Although Italian law (n. 461/1998) requires 
diversification among the assets owned by foundations, for some of them the participation in 
the original bank still represents the core activity (Exhibit 7): in 2010, UniCredit share 
constituted more than 50% of CariVerona portfolio (Filtri and Guglielmi 2012). 
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It is fair to assume that this led to a greater pressure on banks’ management to pay out dividends, 
even when incurring in net losses. Even if UniCredit Group is considered one of the most 
emancipated bank and the closest to the Anglo-Saxon model (Filtri and Guglielmi 2012), it is 
not excludable that internal forces led to non-optimal decisions for the bank. 
3. Foundations are subject to political influence. On average, according to the study conducted 
by Filtri and Guglielmi (2012), 22% of BoD seats are appointed by politicians. In all the three 
banking foundations of UniCredit, every council member is nominated by local mayors, 
universities, episcopates and other regional institutions. The local politicians in turn may exert 
an influence on the corporate governance of the bank: this might be the possible explanation 
for the troubled resignation of Alessandro Profumo back in 2011. During Profumo’s guidance, 
Libyan shareholders reached a share of 7.5%, something that the right-wing and anti-
immigration Northern League party did not appreciate, thus pressuring for a change in 
management. Apparently confirming this hypothesis, Flavio Tosi, major in Verona and 
significant shareholder, remarked his satisfaction few days after the abandonment of Profumo. 
4. Internal accountability and external surveillance are still limited. This is probably the most 
controversial aspect. Foundations are peculiar private institutions that do not have a clear 
ownership, law on foundations is still limited and governance practices remain weak. 
Transparency and accountability are two crucial aspects in which banking foundations are not 
harmonized. 
Banking foundations are now over the control of MEF and since 2015 they have started a so-
called “auto-reform”, improving their risk exposure and corporate governance practices. 
However, it seems remarkable and paradoxical that banks, which are the most regulated 
financial institutions, may be indirectly influenced by organizations with blurred supervision.   
In UniCredit, ownership structure has changed throughout the years of financial crisis, mainly 
due to capital injections that have progressively diluted the rights of traditional shareholder. 
This indirectly led to an improved situation in terms of political influences exerted on the 
bank’s Board. In addition, two main events contributed to a change in the conventional 
equilibria in 2017, at the beginning of Mustier’s direction: 
• The elimination of 5% cap imposed for the voting rights; 
• The explicit introduction of a new rule to nominate the components of the Board: the 
majority list would now be presented by outgoing members instead of majority 
shareholders, therefore limiting their power. Subsequently, the general meeting will 
approve (or refuse) the choices made.  
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In line with what recommended at an international level (Basel Committe on Banking 
Supervision 2015), the board nominated the future candidates and promoted 
appropriate succession planning for board members. As a consequence, every undue 
influence by single shareholder is prevented, at least in the election phase.  
These two interventions were done to finally transform UniCredit in a public company, 
aligning its governance to international best practices. The aim, in turn, was to increasingly 
attract foreign investors by making the bank more independent and competitive (Repubblica.it 
2017).  
IV. What impact did NPLs have in UniCredit performance and lending ability? What are the 
main corrective measures that have been taken? 
According to the definition given by European Banking Authority (2013), “Non-performing 
loans are exposures to debtors who are no longer able to meet all or part of their contractual 
obligations, because their economic and financial circumstances have deteriorated”. 
Additionally, three subclasses are identified: 
• Bad loans, in which debtors are insolvent or in similar circumstances; 
• Unlikely-to-pay exposures, those for which debtors are expected not to fully meet their 
obligations unless action such as the enforcement of guarantees is taken; 
• Overdrawn and/or past-due exposures are those that are overdrawn and/or past-due by 
more than 90 days and for above a predetermined amount.  
While this classification does not have a “first-order” impact on financial statements, because 
it is a mere categorization of already existing loans, NPLs affect financial performance and 
results when provisions or write-offs are included in income statement. A primary effect is the 
reduction of the net operating profit and net income in the period in which the provisions are 
reported; a secondary effect is a lower availability of capital to be used for new and performing 
loans in the future periods; finally, substantial resources within the bank, included human 
capital, are used to manage exposures that with high probability will not pay back the entire 
amount, thus withdrawing further funds.  
In an empirical study conducted in 2015 by Cucinelli, lending behavior of a sample of 498 
Italian banks was explained through a series of different variables, both macroeconomic 
(unemployment, inflation and GDP growth rate) and bank-specific: among them, non-
performing loans over gross loans and loan loss provision ratio were used as measures of credit 
portfolio quality. Results exhibited that credit risk variables have a significant negative impact 
on bank lending behavior; in particular, loan loss provisions at time T – 1, that directly affect 
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the cost income and financial performance, show an immediate effect on lending strategy for 
the following period. 
Furthermore, NPLs, even if adequate provisions are accrued, absorb valued bank capital that 
could be instead freed up to support fresh lending (Jassaud and Kang 2015).  
By analyzing the evolution of UniCredit’s Non-performing exposures from 2011 onwards, it 
is easy to notice that a significant reduction in the overall amount of NPLs has solely occurred 
starting from 2016, in which the gross figure showed a decrease of approximately 30% 
compared to the previous year. This was mainly due to the disposal of bad loans through the 
FINO project and the write-off of past-due exposures, strongly wanted by Mustier.  
(Exhibit 3) 
Throughout the years, UniCredit’s performance seemed affected by the burden of loan loss 
provisions: in 2013 and 2016, the years in which this figure was higher, the bank reported a 
loss of 13.9bn and 11.9bn respectively, that almost correspond to the impairments.  
(Exhibit 2) 
In addition, net loans toward customers showed a decreasing trend until 2015, while NPL over 
total loans ratio increased for the same period. These two figures exhibited an opposite 
direction in 2016-2017, finally with a slight increase in loans granted, consistently with 
Cucinelli study.  
(Exhibit 4) 
However, it is important to underline that these are data extrapolated from UniCredit’s financial 
statements, thus no causation nor correlation relationship has been tested. Other factors, also 
economic crisis itself, may be responsible for the explanation of the reported trends. 
Finally, by approximating the cost of holding NPLs with the cost of the bank Non-core assets 
(NCAs), it was observed that in UniCredit NCAs absorb approximately 6% of Core Tier 1 
capital of the bank (Jassaud and Kang 2015).   
As it emerged from the case, UniCredit management of NPLs substantially started when the 
new Ceo Mustier was appointed; the two main actions taken have been the disposal of 17.7bn 
of bad debts with FINO and the huge write-off in 2016 balance sheet, leading to a considerable 
cleaning in the bank’s financial statements.   
Previous management was reluctant to do serious write-offs, in alignment with the other Italian 
banks. Keeping NPLs within balance sheet and waiting for (partial) repayments was even 
worsened by the slow Italian insolvency law, that did not favor a rapid recover (Humblot 2017).  
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V. Back in 2009, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, the two major credit institutions in Italy, 
declined the offer of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which would have subscribed 
ad hoc debt instruments issued by Italian banks in order to reinforce their capital 
structure. Later, UniCredit launched a capital increase of 4bn, preferring private funds 
instead of public ones. What are the reasons that led to this decision? 
The so-called “Tremonti bonds” (recalling the name of the former Minister Giulio Tremonti) 
are special financial instruments explicitly envisaged by the Italian government first with a 
decree and later converted in the law n. 2/2009. According to the 12th article, titled “Funding 
of the economy through the public subscription of exceptional bank bonds and related 
parliamentary and territorial controls”, Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF from now on) 
was authorized to underwrite instruments issued by banks or banking groups whose 
characteristics made them eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital, more specifically in Core 
Tier 1. 
The bonds exhibited the following features: 
1. Subordinated: because, in case of voluntary or administrative mandatory liquidation 
(liquidazione coatta amministrativa) or other insolvency proceedings, the outstanding debt will 
be reimbursed after all of the bank’s other debt and will rank equally with the ordinary shares; 
2. Hybrid: because they present peculiarities of both debt and equity securities. Furthermore, they 
are convertible in ordinary shares upon request of the issuing bank; 
3. Perpetual: because, unless converted or redeemed earlier, they do not bear any maturity.  
The subscription was subordinated to a prior request by interested banks and a subsequent 
valuation and approval by Bank of Italy (Bazzano and Pagnoni 2009).  
A crucial point of Tremonti bonds, that made them controversial, was the execution of a 
memorandum of understanding (protocollo di intenti), arranged between the issuing bank and 
MEF. Specifically, the bank committed to: 
• Assuring the full availability of credit, in particular for small and medium enterprises, through 
the preservation, for at least three years following the emission, of financial resources for a 
value greater or equal than the amount of such resources available in 2007-2008; 
• Applying credit conditions that reflected the lower risk of financing; 
• Assuring adequate liquidity level for creditors of state entities; 
• Assisting families that were having difficulties caused by temporary suspension (Cassa 
Integrazione) or loss of their jobs, interrupting for at least 12 months the repayment of 
mortgage arrears, without any additional cost; 
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• Promoting agreements with enterprises in order to provide financial resources needed to pay 
the unemployment benefits (Cassa Integrazione); and 
• Modifying the dividend policy in order to favor the bank recapitalization. 
In addition, the issuing bank had to adopt an ethical code (codice etico), including limits to the 
remuneration of top management and bank staff (Bazzano and Pagnoni 2009).  
The reimbursement might be executed according two different models, each of them providing 
advantages and disadvantages for the bank. In the long-term modality of repayment, the bank 
would pay a lower coupon rate, while the principal amount would be above the nominal value 
of the bond. In contrast, in the short-term repayment the principal amount would be equal to 
the nominal value, while paying higher interests in the first four years (Il Sole 24 ORE).  
The interest rate paid should be equal to the greater of three rates: a coupon step-up identified 
by the law; a set percentage (increasing during the years) multiplied by the dividend distributed 
by the bank; or the average return on the issue of 30-year BTPs increased by 300bp (for 2011 
and 2012) and by 350bp (from 2013 onwards). However, the rate cannot exceed 15%(Il Sole 
24 ORE).  
 
Having said this, at least three reasons are accountable for the refusal of UniCredit: 
1. Economic motive: at that time, UniCredit’s cost of equity86 was 12.57%87, given the results of 
FTSE MIB index and UniCredit stock price. The yield was higher than the interest rate 
requested by Tremonti bonds (on average 7.5%-8.5% for the first years), but lower than 
UniCredit cost of debt (3.65% in 200888). Therefore, for the Italian bank it was notably cheaper 
to fund itself through own debt capital rather than employing those debt instruments.   
2. Limitation motive: the mentioned conditions, apart from penalizing the bank from an 
economical perspective, would have limited its freedom of action, by imposing a series of 
obligations to the requesting institution: essentially, the bank would have been forced to grant 
credit when the conditions were not favorable or even unacceptable.  
First, the stated and main objective of Tremonti bonds was incentivizing the supply of credit 
to small and medium enterprises, to avoid credit crunch and to boost real economy. In fact, 
credit expansion to private sector (firms and households) decreased from nearly 12% in the 
first half of 2008 to a null rate in 2009. The figure for the solely corporate sector was even 
																																																						
86 The cost of equity is computed according to the CAPM formula: 
𝑟" = 𝑟$ + 𝛽(𝑟( − 𝑟$) 
87 Data source: Bloomberg 
88 UniCredit Group 2008 
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more alarming, with a funding contraction rate of approximately -5.8% per year (Accornero et 
al. 2017). However, according to the same study, the decline of the loan volume in the first part 
of the financial crisis was mainly due to a decrease in the corporate loan demand rather than a 
contraction in the loan supply by Italian banks. The principal reasons lied in a drop in 
investments and deteriorated creditworthiness: thus, major issues to be resolved were on the 
demand side. By accepting the conditions of Tremonti bonds, the Italian bank would have 
participated in riskier (lending to struggling enterprises) and less profitable activities, 
ultimately damaging its returns. Moreover, the bank should have accepted restrictions 
(liquidity level for creditors of state entity, the suspension of mortgage repayment) that would 
have implied a significant intromission in its governance by the public sector. 
In addition, the modification of dividend payout policy in favor of a recapitalization would 
have negatively impacted on bank shareholders’ yield.  
Finally, the adoption of the ethical code would have lowered salaries and bonuses of top 
management, imposing moderate control over their retribution policy.  
It is easy understandable why this potential interference did not like both to top management 
and to major shareholders, at that time the three foundations. 
3. Signaling motive: the last reason that might be identified to explain the refusal of UniCredit 
may lie on signaling purposes. While the institutions with greatest difficulties (MPS, Popolare 
di Milano and Banco Popolare) requested and obtained the state aid, it is worthy of attention 
that the two most solid financial intermediaries declined the offer. As the CEO Profumo 
himself declared, this was the “demonstration that the banking sector was sound and able to 
operate”. Also the former President of supervisory board in Intesa Sanpaolo, Giovanni Bazoli, 
asserted that this decision proved the good state of health of Italian credit system.   
By rejecting the public aid and instead resorting to private fund, the bank signaled to the market 





































Exhibit 7: Foundations and portfolio composition. Source: Filtri and Guglielmi, 2012. 
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